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Japan’s government is now increasing defence expenditure in the face of growing threats, but its own defence industry still falls short of developing ‘home grown’ solutions.
Japan announced its FY2024 defence budget last December, a record amount of $55.9 billion (JPY7.95 trillion). This figure marked a 16.5 percent increase from a year earlier, and reflected how “Japan is facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II,” as the Defence of Japan 2024 white paper described it, continuing; “It cannot be ruled out that a serious situation similar to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine may occur in the Indo-Pacific region in future, particularly in East Asia.”
Grant Newsham, Senior Research Fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies, told Asian Military Review: “I think Japan recognises and understands the seriousness of the threats it faces from China, North Korea and Russia. Ukraine really spurred Japanese awareness – figuring that Taiwan was next, with everything that would portend for Japan’s security. This has not, however, translated into a Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) that’s organised and capable of fighting a war – despite having some niche capabilities that would be very helpful if employed in support of U.S. forces.”
Newsham highlighted some of Japan’s challenges. “Of course, there are decades of pathological dependence on the Americans to take care of Japan’s defence – that left the JSDF a stunted force not really able to operate efficiently or effectively in most cases. It also gave Japanese politicians an excuse to avoid doing what was necessary to transform the JSDF into a professional force capable of actual war-fighting. Defence has never been a ‘vote-getter’ for Japanese politicians,” he said, whereas construction projects and social welfare schemes do garner votes.
“The so-called ‘pacifist mind-set’ and contrived constitutional prohibitions on an effective defence force have played a role,” Newsham continued, “but a couple of big reasons are that the Americans never insisted Japan gets its ‘defence act’ together, and now that Japan has the desire to improve defence, it really doesn’t know what it needs to do. What sort of force, organisation, weaponry, capabilities, logistics, medical support, reserve system, etc. does it need to transform the JSDF into a proper military and a better ally to the Americans? Tokyo has no idea.”
The JSDF possesses approximately 247,000 members, but in FY2023 it reached only 51 percent of its recruitment targets – just 9,959 personnel. This percentage was the lowest ever, as the JSDF competes against the private sector and a declining birth rate. Newsham argued, however: “As for Japan’s shrinking population, it still has 123 million people and only needs to recruit about 20,000 people a year. That isn’t very much. The Japanese government has never put any effort into making JSDF service a respected profession with proper terms of service – salaries, housing, benefits. If it did so, it could meet recruiting goals.”
JASDF
In FY2023, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) scrambled aircraft 669 times – 479 against Chinese and 174 against Russian aircraft. The backbone of the JASDF fighter fleet is the Mitsubishi F-2, Boeing F-15J and Lockheed Martin F-35A/F-35B.
Looking ambitiously to the future, Japan has thrown its hat in the sixth-generation Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) ring. Japan’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) stated, “Regarding the next-generation fighter aircraft, Japan, the U.K. and Italy will jointly develop an advanced fighter that ensures future air superiority by bringing together technological advantages and sharing costs and risks.” The GCAP platform is expected to enter service in 2035, and it cannot be stressed how monumental this is for Japan to participate so fully in such an international programme.
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) is leading Japan’s GCAP contribution, bringing development work already achieved with its F-X project. As a triumvirate. it will cooperate with BAE Systems and Leonardo, while IHI Corporation and Mitsubishi Electric are involved in engine and radar development respectively. Japan requires around 100 fighters to replace its F-2s, plus it envisages obtaining loyal wingmen alongside the GCAP.
Japan’s aerospace industry is relatively vibrant. Domestic designs in production include Kawasaki’s C-2 transport and P-1 maritime patrol aircraft, while Sikorsky’s SH-60-series helicopter and Boeing’s CH-47 Chinook are both manufactured under license. Subaru also manufactures the UH-2 utility helicopter, a militarised version of Bell’s 412EPX. Nonetheless, Japan still relies on the USA for other aircraft, including Boeing’s KC-46A tanker, Bell-Boeing’s MV-22B Osprey and Northrop Grumman’s E-2D Hawkeye and RQ-4B Global Hawk.
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Kawasaki’s P-1 maritime patrol aircraft shown here releasing flares.
Turning to upcoming requirements, the JASDF needs to replace the Fuji T-7 basic trainers and Kawasaki T-4 intermediate jet trainers. Requests for information (RfI) regarding both were issued in 2021 and, while Japanese industry would like to design and build these aircraft, political considerations may see Tokyo adopt an American platform instead. A joint statement from the two nations’ leaders in April described exploration of “co-development and co-production of cutting-edge technologies such as common jet trainers”.
The USAF has already adopted Boeing-Saab’s T-7A Red Hawk, so opportunities for joint development are limited, although the U.S. Navy is still seeking its own trainer jet. The T-7A is considered an ideal precursor for F-35 pilots, and the JASDF needs something similar. However, Japanese industry would have no real input to the T-7A programme unless it opted for licensed production. Another contender is Leonardo’s M-346, but Japan is unlikely to consider the KAI T-50 given historical friction with South Korea.
The JASDF’s aforementioned T-7 primary trainers were first delivered in 2002, and foreign platforms that may compete to succeed them include Beechcraft’s T-6C Texan II and Pilatus’ PC-21.
Standoff weapons feature highly in JSDF thinking, with a budget of $5.16 billion allocated in FY2024 as Japan seeks to deter naval vessel intrusions or amphibious landings on its remote archipelagic islands. Recent purchases include the Joint Strike Missile (JSM), extended-range AGM-158B/B-2 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) and Tomahawk cruise missile.
JGSDF
An important Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) competition currently running is the replacement of Komatsu’s 4×4 Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV). The Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) is testing both Thales Australia’s Hawkei and General Dynamics Land Systems’ Eagle V, with an initial requirement for around 1,000 vehicles. After extensive trials, evaluations are expected to conclude this year, ahead of a contract award in 2025 to allow the first vehicles to be delivered in 2026. If the Hawkei is selected, MHI will perform local assembly and through-life sustainment.
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Japan’s FY2024 defence budget listed the acquisition of 24 Type 16 Mobile Combat Vehicles (MCV), with plans for an eventual 250 vehicles. Based on the MCV’s 8×8 chassis, the JGSDF is also buying 24 infantry combat vehicles armed with a Mk44 Bushmaster 30mm cannon, and eight mortar carriers boasting a 2R2M 120mm mortar. ATLA expects to sign a contract with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries for this pair of vehicle types this year, thus permitting deliveries in 2027-28. A third MCV-based variant, the combat reconnaissance vehicle, is still under development.
Furthermore, the JGSDF is buying 26 domestically assembled AMVxp 8×8 armoured personnel carriers in FY2024. Patria Group and Japan Steel Works signed a licensing agreement on 31 August 2023, with the Finnish platform destined to replace in-service Type 96 wheeled carriers.
Also listed in the current budget were ten additional Type 10 tanks and 16 Type 19 155mm truck-mounted howitzers. Mitsubishi is the most prominent vehicle producer for the JGSDF, after Komatsu abandoned the defence sector in 2019 citing a lack of profitability. Reflecting a newfound Japanese proclivity for uncrewed systems, MHI is also working on an innovative uncrewed amphibious vehicle for ship-to-shore resupply.
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JGSDF’s Type 10 tank, as well as the Type 16
Mobile Combat Vehicle caught here firing its
105mm gun.
Japanese small-arms requirements are mostly decided. The JGSDF’s newest assault rifle is Howa Machinery’s Type 20, which fires the J-3 5.56x45mm high-power cartridge. Additionally, Japan selected Heckler & Koch’s G28 E2 7.62mm sniper rifle last year, as well as FN Herstal’s Minimi Mk3 5.56mm light machine gun.
Missiles figure prominently in JSDF thinking as well. ATLA conducted the first test launches of Mitsubishi’s Hyper-Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP) in California in March and April. Development of the HVGP commenced in FY2015, and the JGSDF should field the truck-mounted, 310 mile (500km) range Block I version by 2026, after Tokyo accelerated its schedule by three years.
Timothy Wright, research associate in the Defence and Military Analysis Programme of the UK-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, told AMR, “Japan is developing the HVGP for both anti-ship and land attack missions to intercept and eliminate invading forces against Japan at a distance and at an early stage.” Under an incremental development plan, a 1,865 mile (3,000km) range hypersonic Block 2 version should be fielded in FY2030. Wright noted, “Once these systems enter service in large numbers, Japan will possess one of the most significant long-range strike capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region.”
Wright also commented: “Japan’s current missile capabilities reflect the restrictions of its post-1945 defence posture, but those limitations will soon change substantially following Tokyo’s ground-breaking decision in 2023 for it to procure so-called ‘counterstrike’ capabilities.” Japan currently has at least seven new types of air-, sea- and ground-launched missiles in development for land and maritime roles. One is MHI’s improved Type 12 surface-to-ship missile with 560 mile (900+km) range, and another is a scramjet-powered hypersonic weapon.
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JMSDF
Japanese shipbuilders are capable of meeting all Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) requirements, although the latter routinely integrates foreign sensors and weapons. A current project is the Aegis System Equipped Vessel (ASEV). MHI was awarded a detailed design contract for the first ASEV in April and Japan Marine United (JMU) for a second. The first-of-class should be commissioned by March 2028, and the second ship a year later. These ASEVs will relieve the ballistic-missile defence burden on Japan’s eight Aegis destroyers, allowing the latter to provide area air defence and stronger deterrence against maritime incursions by China. The ASEVs were first promulgated as an alternative to Aegis Ashore, after that plan was abandoned in 2020.
The missile-carrying ASEVs will be 623 foot (190m) long and displace 12,000 tonnes. They have 128 missile cells in a Vertical Launching System (VLS), an AN/SPY-7(V)1 radar with Aegis J7.B system, plus a Mk 45 127mm naval gun. Missiles carried are SM-6 and SM-3 Block IIA air defence missiles, plus improved Type 12 anti-ship missiles.
Incidentally, this year’s budget allocated $8.78 billion to integrated air and missile defence, as the prospect of incoming North Korean and Chinese missiles causes Japan major security headaches. This money includes funding for and joint development with the USA on a Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI), and remaining money goes to PAC-3 Patriot, SM-3 Block IIA and SM-6 missiles.
Japan is also working on a future destroyer called the 13DDX, due to enter service in the early 2030s. Possessing layered air defence and connectivity to enhance distributed maritime operations, its high-tech features include a railgun, 100kW-class laser, new surface-to-air missiles, high-powered microwave weapons, multifunction radar that detects high-speed threats, and missiles to counteract hypersonic glide vehicles. ATLA is already researching requisite technologies, with Japan conducting its first shipboard railgun test firing in October 2023.
The JMSDF is looking to boost destroyer and frigate numbers, in line with Japan’s mounting security threats. MHI launched the ninth of 12 3,900-tonne 30FFM/Mogami-class frigates on 24 June. A 16-cell Mk 41 VLS will be retrofitted to the class, enabling these frigates to reach their full missile-carrying potential. Incidentally, the 30FFM is one of five designs shortlisted by Australia for its general-purpose frigate programme to replace the Anzac class.
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Tokyo’s latest budget also allocated $1.11 billion for the first two of 12 4,800-tonne 30FFM-follow-on frigates. These have “improved operational capabilities, which can load long-range missiles and have better anti-submarine capability,” according to the MoD. The first is due for induction in FY2028.
Submarine construction is shared between MHI and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, with an eighth 29SS Taigei-class boat funded in the FY2024 budget. Elsewhere, JMU is modifying the JMSDF’s two Izumo-class helicopter carriers so they can act as mobile platforms for F-35B fighters.
Earlier, in June 2022, ATLA selected JMU as prime contractor to construct 1,920-tonne offshore patrol vessels (OPV). JMU, and MHI as subcontractor, are expected to together construct twelve OPVs featuring significant degrees of automation to reduce crewing. As Chinese naval activity increases around Japan, current vessel numbers make it difficult for the JMSDF to respond appropriately. These 311ft (95m) long OPVs, to be introduced by 2029 for use in low-threat environments, should help alleviate this problem. The OPVs will be armed with 30mm cannons, while a hangar and flight deck will permit UAV operations. Japan hopes to export its extant OPV design too.
Transport vessels to “swiftly deliver units and supplies to remote islands in the southwestern region” are also highlighted in this year’s budget. Called Manoeuvre Support Vessels, the budget allotted money for three ships in tri-service maritime transport units. The military also relies on civilian shipping to move equipment southwards. In the medium term, the JMSDF will need a successor to its three hardworking 8,900-tonne Oosumi-class landing ships too, plus a new 14,500-tonne support ship has already been authorised.
Japan has been slow to leverage UAVs, but it currently has a requirement for medium-range intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) UAVs fitted with synthetic aperture radar. An image in the FY2024 budget illustrated a ScanEagle/Integrator-sized UAV. The JMSDF is presently trialling a General Atomics MQ-9B SeaGuardian to see whether it can take over missions previously performed by crewed aircraft. In fact, the Japan Coast Guard has been operating three SeaGuardians since 2022. The JMSDF is practicing closer cooperation with the Coast Guard, since the latter would fall under MoD control in a conflict.
Defence industry
Japan is attempting to reinvigorate its defence industry, which struggles to compete on the international arena. Comparing Japanese defence exports with South Korea’s, for example, is like comparing apples with oranges. One of Japan’s few successes was Mitsubishi Electric’s sale of air surveillance radars to the Philippines.
Japan’s domestic defence companies face considerable hurdles, such as small-quantity, multi-year orders from the JSDF, and export restrictions imposed by the strict Three Principles on Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology. In October 2023, a new policy advocated measures such as financial support to industries to improve manufacturing efficiency, and raising supply chain resilience. For the first time, the MoD now offers a direct financial support scheme to defence companies.
Significantly, in March, Tokyo approved further easing of export restrictions to allow global export of lethal weapons and munitions under certain conditions. One beneficiary is the $19 million sale of PAC-3 missiles to the USA to help replenish the latter’s stocks after earlier deliveries to Ukraine.
Overall, U.S. support remains critical to Japan. Newsham even remarked, “Japan has always been pathologically dependent on the USA. These days, given the scale of the Chinese threat (and even more so if combined with the Russian and North Korean threats), it’s clear that the Japanese absolutely must have the U.S. military at hand to defend the nation. Japan really can’t defend itself alone, and there’s no combination of partners in the region or elsewhere that could make up for U.S. defence ‘services’.”
Is Japan over-reliant on the USA? “Probably so,” Newsham said. “This is why the JSDF is not nearly as useful to Japan or to the Americans as it ought to be. It needed to improve starting years ago, but such is life. The Americans and Japanese either hang together or hang separately, paraphrasing Ben Franklin. The Americans might have a chance alone against the Chinese, but it would be tough. The Japanese have no chance at all.”
by Gordon Arthur