Australia increasingly favours the issuance of major defence policy documents, but whether they improve military readiness is questionable. Defence white papers were issued in 1976, 1987, 1994, 2000, 2009, 2013 and 2016. A Defence Strategic Update was issued in 2020 and the Defence Strategic Review last year.
Numerous directional changes and deficient planning are perhaps seen most clearly in Australia’s naval capability. As the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) eyed replacements for ageing Collins-class submarines, the French-designed Attack-class submarine was glowingly described in 2016 as being “regionally superior”. Except a reassessment a few years later showed it was not so superior after all.
It is now two and a half years since Canberra announced it was pursuing nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS agreement instead. Australia is now totally dependent on its US and UK partners, including the whimsies of future political leaders. The USA’s current submarine build rate is 1.2-1.3 annually, which needs to ramp up to 2.33 if Australia is to receive its anticipated 3-5 Virginia-class SSNs in the 2030s. However, the American FY2025 budget still only funds one SSN.
Are Australian submarine plans in danger yet again? If the USA cannot supply them, this sends China a signal of lacklustre American intentions and the questionable importance it places on alliances in Asia-Pacific. American credibility would be undermined if it reneges, and the RAN will suffer a yawning capability gap as its Collins-class boats age.
Arafura-class offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) are another example of questionable planning. Lürssen was selected in 2018 to build 12 OPVs, but now the RAN wants to wash its hands of them. An important surface fleet review published in February slashed this OPV programme to six vessels, warning, “The OPV is an inefficient use of resources for civil maritime security operations and does not possess the survivability and self-defence systems to contribute to a surface combatant mission.”
A class of nine Hunter-class frigates will reduce from nine to six under the same review. It seems Australia is intent on infuriating as many naval shipbuilders as possible – Naval Group, BAE Systems, Lürssen etc.
Instead, to rapidly beef up numbers in a force depleted by its own lack of foresight, the RAN will seek 11 general-purpose frigates. The first trio will be constructed overseas, with Germany’s MEKO A-200, Japan’s 30FFM Mogami, South Korea’s FFX Batch II/III and Spain’s Alfa 3000 already shortlisted.
This aforementioned surface combatant review promised the RAN its largest surface warship fleet since WWII, with hull numbers more than doubling from 11 to 26. However, long before this ambition is realised, Australia’s surface flotilla is soon going to narrow to just nine warships. The oldest Anzac-class frigate will not sail again, and HMAS Arunta will retire in 2026.
The RAN will also adopt six Large Optionally Crewed Surface Vessels from the mid-2030s. Based on an American design, they will possess 32 vertical missile cells for long-range strike. These are essentially extra magazines to supplement destroyers and frigates. Yet in another twist of logic, Australia said these vessels would be manned, thus defeating the whole purpose of choosing an optionally manned vessel in the first place!
Defence Minister Richard Marles stated: “The enhanced-lethality surface combatant fleet will ensure the navy is optimised for operations in our current and future environment…” Yet herein lies the problem.
Why is Australia constantly altering course? Has the strategic environment changed so dramatically in the past five, ten or 15 years, and why does it continually fail to predict future requirements?
If Australia’s military has been caught unawares by strategic events, then a finger of blame needs to be pointed somewhere. Should it be politicians or defence planners? The rise of China, for example, is not a sudden surprise. To cap off all this poor planning, Australia’s capability gap will be worst in the late 2020s when perhaps the threat is greatest that China will invade Taiwan.
Australia will incur huge expense procuring and sustaining its SSNs, as well as these new surface vessels. This will require sustained funding over numerous years. If this and future governments can pull it off, then the RAN will have an impressively modern and powerful force. If!
Another challenge needing to be surmounted is creating a suitably skilled and sized shipbuilding workforce. Also, the military needs to recruit enough sailors and technicians to crew and maintain all these vessels. As at the start of 2024, the defence force was 6.9 percent, or 4,308 people, below its authorised strength.
by Gordon Arthur
