On 26 August the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) monitoring site NKNews.org reported a Russian government Tupolev Tu-154 VIP passenger jet taking off from Vladivostok airport shortly after 07:00 and landing in Pyongyang two hours later. The aircraft was the second flight of this type in August – carrying what was reported as a senior Russian trade delegation.
These and other Russia-DPRK interactions show an increasing level of cooperation between the two nations and with a clear dynamic to the relationship. From Pyongyang Russia receives massive shipments of munitions, which Russian President Vladimir Putin’s army is burning through in Ukraine at a rate well above the production capacity of its ammunition suppliers. These deliveries from the DPRK are singularly responsible in compensating for those shortfalls and sustaining the one-time KGB Lieutenant Colonel’s war machine.
In a recent Time magazine, the ROK defence minister, Shin Wonsik, estimated that in recent months 10,000 shipping containers had been transferred to Russia, containing up to 4.8 million artillery shells. Pyongyang has also shipped dozens of KN-23 (Hwasong-11Ga) model short range ballistic missiles to Moscow, their origin being verified by inspections in Ukraine of partially-intact fragments remaining after impact.
That North Korean industry has literally rescued the Russian Army from having to withdraw from Ukrainian territory for lack of artillery shells and other calibres of ammunition has not been lost on Ukraine’s allies.
At the July 2024 NATO summit in Washington, DC, the DPRK and Iran were both accused of “fuelling” the Russian destruction of Ukraine by providing “direct military support.” Pyongyang was specifically denounced for the transfers “artillery shells and ballistic missiles” to the Russian military.
PYONGYANG’S PAYBACK
One of the main benefits for the regime of Kim Jong-un, the DPRK party leader and dictatorial ruler, is the hard currency or Chinese yuan and illegal oil shipments that Moscow pays out for this endless stream of ammunition. This is the life’s blood of the perennially cash-poor DPRK, which breaks all records in finding illicit methods of importing oil and earning foreign currency.
An August 2022 report in The Diplomat outlines how the DPRK pulls in earnings from abroad despite being one of the most sanctioned nations in the world and almost completely isolated from the international banking system.
“For decades, the North Korean government earned foreign currency by secretly exporting military weapons and technology, illicit drugs, fake cigarettes, and counterfeit currency,” states the publication. “Through the years, there has also been a large amount of foreign currency brought in by people [residing full-time] in Japan and China.”
According to a 5 September report in the Wall Street Journal the latest scam involves North Koreans having been “hired for hundreds—and potentially thousands—of low-level information-technology jobs and other roles in recent years, using stolen identities of foreigners, U.S. officials and security researchers said.” The regime is earning millions through this operation. In meantime, these DPRK cyber operatives in disguise “have used their access to company networks to steal intellectual property or quietly open a backdoor to launch cyberattacks.”
But worth far more to Kim’s regime is the access Putin has permitted him to Russia’s most sophisticated defence industrial technology. Among these are detailed capabilities in stealth fighter aircraft configuration, next-generation main battle tanks, nuclear submarine propulsion, satellite systems and – most worrying of all – ballistic missile design. The latter is likely to boost the DPRK’s intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) programmes to a level where they may actually be able to successfully target missiles on the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan – or possibly even the United States.
“I think this is the biggest threat emanating from the Korean Peninsula since the Korean War,” Victor Cha, the senior vice president for Asia and the Korea chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, commented after Kim and Putin met for a June 2024 summit in Pyongyang, where they signed a mutual defence pact and other agreements.
Most of these technologies had been on Russia’s ‘not-for export’ list for decades out of concerns for the consequences associated with their proliferation. But this restriction appears to have been lifted due to the desperate spot the former KGB Lt. Col. finds himself in after a more than two-year war in Ukraine that has his Army failing in its objectives and running out of personnel, munitions and military vehicles.
In September 2023, Kim had visited the Russian Far East and received guided tours of the major defence plants in the region. Accompanied by senior Russian officials, including Minister for Trade and Industry (MinTorgProm) Denys Manturov, he composed the ‘shopping list’ of defence tech he and Putin discussed in their meeting nine months later.
It is therefore, not much of a surprise that the 26 August delegation departed from an airport in that same region of Russia. The fact it was not a direct flight from Moscow could be due to the Tu-154M not having the range fly from the Russian capital to Pyongyang without refuelling.
But it could also be because the defence enterprises the DPRK is looking to source technology transfer from are also located in that Far East region. The aeroplane would likely have collected the heads of those defence firms that the DPRK rulers has visited and added them to the delegation of MinTorgProm officials, the heads of the major defence industrial holding firms (OAK, KRET, KRTV, etc.) and the ever-present Rosoboronexport functionaries that had flown in from Moscow.
HORSE TRADERS
But, in a bizarre twist, one of the other forms of payment from Russia was a shipment of 24 purebred white Orlov Trotter horses – 19 stallions and five mares – said to be Kim’s favourite breed. It was the second such delivery, with 30 of the same breed having been gifted to Kim two years before, according to The Times of London.
Kim is reportedly expending investing hundreds of thousands of dollars into creating special equestrian military units. Between 2020 and 2023, the DPRK spent $600,000 alone on importing thoroughbred horses from Russia.
DPRK observers state that despite the units being incorporated into the Korean People’s Army, horses act more in a symbolic, rather than military, role for Kim. Part of the dictator’s family’s personality cult is the frequent depictions in paintings and in photos of him riding a white horse. It is a high price to pay given the impoverished state of the country.
“There could not be a more vivid comparison created by this imagery,” said a DPRK analyst who spoke to AMR. “Kim is riding horses provided by Putin to burnish his image as the immortal and all-knowing sainted leader of his people, which keeps him in power while his country is in a dire economic state.
“But the ‘white horse’ Putin rides to stay in power is this mass of artillery shells and other military aid from the DPRK which he is using to try and defeat Ukraine. The question is, which one of these two ‘horses’ will tire out first and then no longer support its rider.”
by Reuben Johnson
