To achieve a world-class military, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is pursuing the three parallel pillars of ‘mechanisation, informatisation and intelligentisation’. The latter gained traction after the ‘China’s National Defense in the New Era’ white paper of 2019 stated that the PLA would evolve from informationised to intelligentised warfare through technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum information, big data, cloud computing and the Internet of things.
Chinese research papers reveal that the PLA plans to wield AI in four key areas. The first is autonomous uncrewed weapons, such as drone swarms. Another is processing copious quantities of data using machine learning (e.g. in electronic warfare so radio waves can be better jammed). A third critical area is in accelerating decision-making, though this comes with attendant risks of sudden flares in escalation.
The fourth area of AI development is the cognitive warfare realm, where the enemy’s cognition and will to fight are diminished without needing to resort to armed conflict. Examples of this application are AI-generated deep fakes circulated via social media.
In 2022, Chairman Xi Jinping urged, “We will establish a strong system of strategic deterrence, increase the proportion of new-domain forces with new combat capabilities, speed up the development of unmanned, intelligent combat capabilities, and promote coordinated development and application of the network information system.”
Latterly, to improve the PLA’s pathway towards intelligentisation, Xi instigated a major PLA reorganisation on 19 April. It constituted the most serious restructure since the overhauls of 2015-16, which included the establishment of the Strategic Support Force (SSF) on 31 December 2015.
At April’s solemn ceremony in Beijing, the SSF was disbanded and superseded by the Information Support Force. Using typical official gobbledygook, a PLA spokesman explained: “Establishing the Information Support Force through restructuring is a major decision…for the cause of building a strong military, and a strategic step to establish a new system of services and arms and improve the modern military force structure with Chinese characteristics.”
The Information Support Force’s roles remain murky, apart from vague explanations of “coordinated development and application of network information systems”. This indicates it will handle network information systems, communications support and probably network defence.
The reorganisation suggests Xi was dissatisfied with the SSF’s performance too. Improving military operational efficiency and strengthening political oversight were prominent reasons for the shift. By dismantling the SSF, Xi has deleted a headquarters management layer and he now has direct oversight over the cyber, information and space realms.
Incidentally, some speculate the notorious high-altitude spy balloon saga over the USA in February 2023 may have played a role in Xi’s decision. That covert SSF programme could have caught Xi off-guard and encouraged him to demand greater visibility and control.
Consequently, the PLA now features a more streamlined “4+4” force structure of four armed services – the PLA Army, Navy, Air Force and Rocket Force – plus four arms. The latter comprise the freshly formed Information Systems Department, joined by the newly elevated Aerospace Force and Cyberspace Force, and the incumbent Joint Logistics Support Force.
One advantage is that the four arms are now controlled directly by the Central Military Commission, the top party body in charge of China’s military/paramilitary forces. Amidst transformation towards intelligentisation, centralised control becomes even more paramount for the communist party.
Another benefit is that the four arms are now one grade lower than the PLA’s five theatre commands and four armed services, with each arm led by a deputy theatre command leader grade. Given the theatre commands’ amplified seniority, they can more easily request support from the four arms without resorting to a higher headquarters. This move should improve functionality for joint operations, in what is traditionally a stove-piped military organisation.
Disruption caused by the formation of the Information Support Force should be manageable. The Aerospace Force and Cyberspace Force can carry on much as before, as these were essentially former SSF departments that have been elevated to full forces.
China stated that the reorganisation “is of profound and far-reaching significance to the modernisation of national defence and the armed forces, and effective fulfilment of the missions and tasks of the people’s military in the new era”.
The PLA considers the information domain as important as the four domains of air, land, sea and space, and creation of the Information Support Force will enable it to accelerate its intelligentisation efforts.
by Gordon Arthur